The G 20 and the GCC Agenda

17/11/2008

When the world's powers gather together during the month of November in the United States to begin a series of meetings to discuss the global financial crisis, the Gulf Cooperation Council states (GCC - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) will be an important component of the discussion. While Saudi Arabia will be an active direct participant, the other GCC states will be keen listeners. To be sure, these states are impacted by the financial crisis just as much as other countries despite having large financial reserves based on their position as the world's most significant oil producers. In fact, the GCC states are likely to face a certain degree of pressure for an anticipated constructive role they will be expected to play. For example, US President Bush has already been suggesting that he is looking forward to the involvement of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the summit. Similarly, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown has called for the Gulf States to contribute to a new fund facility being created within the International Monetary Fund.

In this context, it is important to remember that the GCC states have traditionally played a stabilizing role whether in terms of financial markets through their investment decisions or by maintaining price equilibrium and stable supplies to the world's energy markets. This position will not change. However, it is important that the discussions on the current financial crisis not be limited to the present economic agenda only but that the meeting also considers the broader political context in which this crisis is occurring and being handled. For the GCC countries this is an important item on the overall agenda and it will be necessary for other participating countries, including the United States, to comprehend that solely seeing the position of the GCC states in economic terms is no longer sufficient.

The reason for a broader agenda is that the current global financial crisis cannot and should not be seen in isolation. It is indeed the culmination and manifestation of a series of interrelated unresolved problems, which have led to accumulated tensions in the international political, security and economic system, tensions that are causing deep fractures in the system itself. One way to compare the situation is to relate it to how earthquakes occur. Here, tectonic plates are constantly in movement, getting closer or farther from each other. Such movements create growing stress at the points of juncture between plates, stress which must be released either through multiple smaller adjustments (small earthquakes) or through a major, sometimes catastrophic event.

Today, we are witnessing a major earthquake whose epicenter is in the United States and in the financial system, but its origins are not exclusively in either of the two.

The global system has accumulated stress in many of the plates that constitute it. This includes the following, not necessarily exhaustive, list:

The international trade plate has seen rapid progress towards globalization, with shifting production of material goods from the traditional industrial countries to new emerging countries, creating greater and greater trade imbalances with growing problems for employment in the industrial countries and the progressive disappearance of industry. These trends are not sustainable, in the sense that if one extrapolates them into the future, one comes to a vision which is paradoxical and clearly unacceptable. So, something must be done: not necessarily a complete reversal of liberalization, but surely a less ideological implementation of free trade, with exceptions and a degree of state re-involvement in the economy. Signs of that are already evident.

The international energy system is characterized by a huge imbalance in the level of per capita energy consumption between the US and the rest of the industrial countries; between the industrial countries and the emerging countries; between even the emerging countries and the poorer countries, including almost the whole of Africa, where billions of people do not have access to commercial energy at all. Available reserves of fossil fuel together with environmental considerations clearly tell us that the current pattern of energy consumption in the industrial (and the GCC) countries is unsustainable. Something must change very radically if one wishes to be able to envision an acceptable scenario of the future.

The international security system has been characterized by the unchallenged and unchallengeable supremacy of a single superpower, but whose immense military might has proven totally ineffective to achieve the objectives that matter. The US has not been able to win the war either in Iraq or in Afghanistan and has found its hands tied with regard to Iran. As a result, the US is looking like a useless superpower - it has the might to destroy the world but cannot impose its will unilaterally. This is an untenable position in the long run. The non-proliferation file will probably be one on which things must change quite rapidly. Faced with the resurgence of interest in nuclear energy and the impossibility of keeping nuclear ambitions in check in Iran or North Korea or elsewhere, the nuclear powers will either have to admit defeat or finally accept a substantial reduction in their nuclear arsenals. A complete rethinking of the US military strategy in the coming months and years is one aspect that can be anticipated.

The international financial system is the easiest to understand just now. For years, the system has been based on deregulation and the massive encouragement of indebtedness for US consumers and enterprises, paralleled by growing government debt and trade deficit - all based on the thinking that this was the rest of the world's problem, not the US's. The rest of the world was expected to be forever happy to buy US assets - and it has been by and large, except that the system within the US itself at some point collapsed. It is very interesting that the crisis originated out of the mortgage market, not out of a global crisis of confidence in the US economy or the US dollar. That the US financial posture was untenable has been evident for years - but the IMF and everybody else hoped for a soft landing. Instead, the soft landing has turned into a crash with the result that the international financial system will have to obviously be established on new bases.

All of the above only substantiates the claim that one cannot simply tackle the financial crisis without at the same time also addressing some of the political issues. For the GCC states, this means that they must concentrate on a few key points:

Get from the United States a clear commitment that they will support regional integration – within the GCC and with the rest of the Arab countries. The US has been systematically sniping at the GCC and this must stop. In line with the above, the GCC states should seek a commitment to honestly work towards a regional security system that is based on progressively building mutual trust rather than on the military presence of the US in the region.

Get assurances that the trade system will be redesigned in a way that is not contrary to the interests of the GCC countries. This means a combination of openness to international trade with tolerance of state intervention which is geared to achieving developmental objectives. While this is very difficult to articulate in practice, the general idea is clear.

Get assurances that a major effort will be made to put the non-proliferation train back on track, which includes negotiating a substantial cut in the arsenal of the nuclear powers and putting pressure on all countries to become parties to the NPT

Get assurances that the new international financial system will not tolerate systematic imbalances, not even in the US, and that international investment will be free within well understood rules. There should be no discrimination against Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs).

Ask for US support for the four key diplomatic initiatives of Saudi Arabia with respect to regional crises:

King Abdullah's peace plan to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

King Abdullah's diplomatic initiative to start a dialogue between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

The Saudi position towards a united Iraq in which all components share in power.

The engagement of Iran in a regional context.

All of the above are essential points and they represent a comprehensive framework that the GCC states should pursue as the discussion about resolving the present global financial crisis proceeds. Isolated and single point solutions will not work and it is time to adopt a broader approach.

Economics of Nuclear Technology

Author: Pranav Bhat

Nuclear Technology can also be used to produce ELECTRICITY which is very important according to economical condition of a country. Nuclear plant can produce more electricity than thermal or hydro electric plant.
Isotope produced using Nuclear Technology is used in many chemical and pharma companies.

1)Nuclear power is cost competitive with other forms of electricity generation, except where there is direct access to low-cost fossil fuels.
2)Fuel costs for nuclear plants are a minor proportion of total generating costs, though capital costs are greater than those for coal-fired plants.
3)In assessing the cost competitiveness of nuclear energy, decommissioning and waste disposal costs are taken into account.

The relative costs of generating electricity from coal, gas and nuclear plants vary considerably depending on location. Coal is, and will probably remain, economically attractive in countries such as China, the USA and Australia with abundant and accessible domestic coal resources as long as carbon emissions are cost-free. Gas is also competitive for base-load power in many places, particularly using combined-cycle plants, though rising gas prices have removed much of the advantage.
Nuclear energy is, in many places, competitive with fossil fuel for electricity generation, despite relatively high capital costs and the need to internalise all waste disposal and decommissioning costs. If the social, health and environmental costs of fossil fuels are also taken into account, nuclear is outstanding.

External costs

The report of a major European study of the external costs of various fuel cycles, focusing on coal and nuclear, was released in mid 2001 - ExternE. It shows that in clear cash terms nuclear energy incurs about one tenth of the costs of coal. The external costs are defined as those actually incurred in relation to health and the environment and quantifiable but not built into the cost of the electricity. If these costs were in fact included, the EU price of electricity from coal would double and that from gas would increase 30%. These are without attempting to include global warming.
The European Commission launched the project in 1991 in collaboration with the US Department of Energy, and it was the first research project of its kind "to put plausible financial figures against damage resulting from different forms of electricity production for the entire EU". The methodology considers emissions, dispersion and ultimate impact. With nuclear energy the risk of accidents is factored in along with high estimates of radiological impacts from mine tailings (waste management and decommissioning being already within the cost to the consumer). Nuclear energy averages 0.4 euro cents/kWh, much the same as hydro, coal is over 4.0 cents (4.1-7.3), gas ranges 1.3-2.3 cents and only wind shows up better than nuclear, at 0.1-0.2 cents/kWh average.

Fuel costs are one area of steadily increasing efficiency and cost reduction. For instance, in Spain nuclear electricity cost has been reduced by 29% over 1995-2001. This involved boosting enrichment levels and burn-up to achieve 40% fuel cost reduction. Prospectively, a further 8% increase in burn-up will give another 5% reduction in fuel cost.

The cost of fuel

From the outset the basic attraction of nuclear energy has been its low fuel costs compared with coal, oil and gas fired plants. Uranium, however, has to be processed, enriched and fabricated into fuel elements, and about two thirds of the cost is due to enrichment and fabrication. Allowances must also be made for the management of radioactive spent fuel and the ultimate disposal of this spent fuel or the wastes separated from it.
But even with these included, the total fuel costs of a nuclear power plant in the OECD are typically about a third of those for a coal-fired plant and between a quarter and a fifth of those for a gas combined-cycle plant.
Fuel costs are one area of steadily increasing efficiency and cost reduction. For instance, in Spain nuclear electricity cost was reduced by 29% over 1995-2001. This involved boosting enrichment levels and burn-up to achieve 40% fuel cost reduction. Prospectively, a further 8% increase in burn-up will give another 5% reduction in fuel cost.

Comparing electricity generation

For nuclear power plants any cost figures normally include spent fuel management, plant decommissioning and final waste disposal. These costs, while usually external for other technologies, are internal for nuclear power.
Decommissioning costs are estimated at 9-15% of the initial capital cost of a nuclear power plant. But when discounted, they contribute only a few percent to the investment cost and even less to the generation cost. In the USA they account for 0.1-0.2 cent/kWh, which is no more than 5% of the cost of the electricity produced.
The back-end of the fuel cycle, including spent fuel storage or disposal in a waste repository, contributes up to another 10% to the overall costs per kWh, - less if there is direct disposal of spent fuel rather than reprocessing. The $18 billion US spent fuel program is funded by a 0.1 cent/kWh levy.
French figures published in 2002 show (EUR cents/kWh): nuclear 3.20, gas 3.05-4.26, coal 3.81-4.57. Nuclear is favourable because of the large, standardised plants used.
The cost of nuclear power generation has been dropping over the last decade. This is because declining fuel (including enrichment), operating and maintenance costs, while the plant concerned has been paid for, or at least is being paid off. In general the construction costs of nuclear power plants are significantly higher than
for coal- or gas-fired plants because of the need to use special materials, and to incorporate sophisticated safety features and back-up control equipment. These contribute much of the nuclear generation cost, but once the plant is built the variables are minor.
In the past, long construction periods have pushed up financing costs. In Asia construction times have tended to be shorter, for instance the new-generation 1300 MWe Japanese reactors which began operating in 1996 and 1997 were built in a little over four years.
Overall, OECD studies in teh 1990s showed a decreasing advantage of nuclear over coal. This trend was largely due to a decline in fossil fuel prices in the 1980s, and easy access to low-cost, clean coal, or gas. In the 1990s gas combined-cycle technology with low fuel prices was often the lowest cost option in Europe and North America. But the picture is changing.

Future cost competitiveness

The OECD does not expect investment costs in new nuclear generating plants to rise, as advanced reactor designs become standardised.
The future competitiveness of nuclear power will depend substantially on the additional costs which may accrue to coal generating plants. It is uncertain how the real costs of meeting targets for reducing sulphur dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions will be attributed to fossil fuel plants.
Overall, and under current regulatory measures, the OECD expects nuclear to remain economically competitive with fossil fuel generation, except in regions where there is direct access to low cost fossil fuels.
In Australia, for example, coal-fired generating plants are close to both the mines supplying them and the main population centres, and large volumes of gas are available on low cost, long-term contracts.
A 1998 OECD comparative study showed that at a 5% discount rate, in 7 of 13 countries considering nuclear energy, it would be the preferred choice for new base-load capacity commissioned by 2010 (see Table below). At a 10% discount rate the advantage over coal would be maintained in only France, Russia and China.

FACTORS FAVOURING URANIUM
Uranium has the advantage of being a highly concentrated source of energy which is easily and cheaply transportable. The quantities needed are very much less than for coal or oil. One kilogram of natural uranium will yield about 20,000 times as much energy as the same amount of coal. It is therefore intrinsically a very portable and tradeable commodity.
The fuel's contribution to the overall cost of the electricity produced is relatively small, so even a large fuel price escalation will have relatively little effect. For instance, a doubling of the 2002 U3O8 price would increase the fuel cost for a light water reactor by 30% and the electricity cost about 7% (whereas doubling the gas price would add 70% to the price of electricity).

REPROCCESSING & MOX

There are other possible savings. For example, if spent fuel is reprocessed and the recovered plutonium and uranium is used in mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, more energy can be extracted. The costs of achieving this are large, but are offset by MOX fuel not needing enrichment and particularly by the smaller amount of high-level wastes produced at the end. Seven UO2 fuel assemblies give rise to one MOX assembly plus some vitrified high-level waste, resulting in only about 35% of the volume, mass and cost of disposal.
For different fuel costs (fossil fuels) or lead time (nuclear plants). Assumes 5% discount trate, 30 year life and 70% load factor. While the figures are out of date, the comparison remains relevant. Note that the key factor for fossil fuels is the high or low cost of fuels (top portion of bars), whereas nuclear power has a low proportion of fuel cost in total electricity cost and the key factor is the short or long lead time in planning and construction, hence investment cost (bottom portion of bars). Increasing the load factor thus benefits nuclear more than coal, and both these more than oil or gas. (OECD IEA 1992)

Source: http://www.articlesbase.com/

IAEA Daily Press Review

The objective of the DPR is to present a general overview of international, English-language, media coverage of the IAEA and nuclear issues, that does not purport to be exhaustive. The following articles are obtained from external news sources for whose content the IAEA takes no responsibility.

10 March 2008

IAEA in the News

Iran Ready to Talk Nuclear With Europe Iran is ready to negotiate with Europe over the Islamic republic's nuclear program if there were would be ''meaningful and effective'' results, Iran's foreign minister said Sunday. AP

Iran's nuclear program: talk of international consortium Interest is growing in a possible US-Iran nuclear compromise that could enable sensitive atomic work on Iranian soil, lower the risks of proliferation, and ease Iran's isolation. CSMonitor

India - IAEA Pact Close But U.S. Nuclear Deal Clouded India is close to finalizing the text for an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, but may fail to save a nuclear deal between New Delhi and Washington that remains clouded in political uncertainty. Reuters

Other Nuclear News

Reformers Decry Iran President's Nuclear Rhetoric A leading Iranian reformist said on Sunday that "provocative" speeches had damaged Iran's nuclear cause and its diplomatic standing in a veiled attack on Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Reuters

Peres calls Iran 'greatest problem' in the world, but says Israel will not act alone President Shimon Peres on Sunday called Iran the world's "greatest problem" but said Israel would not act on its own against the Islamic nation's nuclear program. AP

Destruction of Iran's nuclear program good, if done by Israel, even better: Kuwaiti analyst The destruction of Iran's nuclear capabilities would be in the interest of the Arab nations in the Gulf, and it would be "less embarrassing" if it was done by Israel rather than the U.S., a top Kuwaiti strategist said in remarks published Sunday. AP

US renews calls for North Korea to declare nuclear programs The top U.S. envoy to South Korea renewed Washington's commitment to removing North Korea from U.S. terrorism and trade blacklists if the communist government fully accounts for its nuclear weapons programs. AP

'Dirty bomb' threat as UK ships plutonium to France Weapons-ready plutonium that terrorists could easily make into a nuclear bomb is to be carried hundreds of miles down the west coast of Britain in an unarmed ship, The Independent on Sunday can reveal. The Independent

China's nuclear power expansion "faster than planned" China is expanding nuclear power construction plans faster than earlier planned, a senior energy official told state media on Saturday, saying installed power capacity by 2020 could be 50 percent above the initial goal. Reuters

Deep under Sweden's soil could lie a solution to the UK's nuclear waste problem Inside the cavernous hall of a nuclear storage plant in southern Sweden, an 18-tonne steel canister, bristling with tiny fins to draw out excess heat, is being hauled slowly through a hatch by a crane. The Times

Opinion and Analysis

Final Warning on India Nukes Deal Time

Don't Nuke The Deal The Times of India

Nuclear States’ Double Standards The Korea Times

Source: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/

Nuclear States’ Double Standards

By Valerie Epps From time to time, the world community becomes concerned that a country, or other entity, not currently possessing nuclear weapons, might be on the road to acquiring them. First it was Iraq, then it was Iran or al-Qaida. Recently, the discussion has shifted to trying to persuade the North Koreans to abandon further development of nuclear weapons. Most people are rightly convinced that the fewer nuclear weapons there are, and the fewer people with access to such weapons, the better off we all are. But there is something decidedly odd about the structure of the legal argument about the right to possess nuclear weapons. Groups of nations have often come together to ban certain sorts of weapons. The 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg prohibited certain explosive projectiles; biological weapons were outlawed in 1972; chemical weapons in 1993; land mines in 1997; and a long list of other weapons have also been declared illegal. These weapons were banned because they were perceived as violating the laws of war. Although soldiers are permitted to kill the enemy in warfare, weapons that cause unnecessary suffering to combatants are prohibited. Civilians may never be targeted in warfare and thus a weapon that cannot distinguish between military and civilian targets violates the law, as does a weapon, which although targeting the military, in fact, kills a disproportionate number of civilians. Whenever there is sufficient sentiment to ban a weapon, states draft a treaty, work out the final language, and sign on to the ban. These treaties contemplate a total ban of the designated weapon. They do not list countries that are permitted to retain the prohibited weapon, nor do parties to such treaties indicate that states who chose not to ratify the treaty will be entirely free to acquire the banned weapon. Most of us learn early in our lives that if we expect rules that we set to be respected, we cannot promulgate the rule and, at the same time, grant ourselves a permanent exception. The main treaty that deals with nuclear weapons, the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, has a very different and fundamentally flawed structure. This treaty specifically permits five states ― China, France, Russia, the U.K. and the U.S. ― to retain nuclear weapons, but any other party to the treaty must agree to forgo the acquisition of nuclear weapons. States that refuse to ratify the treaty, such as Cuba, Pakistan, India and Israel are free to acquire such weapons, and three of them have done so. Why are states and other entities so eager to retain or acquire nuclear weapons? The motive is the same whether a state already has such weapons or hopes to acquire them. Nuclear weapons are perceived as giving the possessor a huge military advantage. The determination on the part of the five nuclear declared states to create a structure that allows them to retain nuclear weapons while denying ownership to other nations, is exactly the same sort of determination that we see being brought to bear by states, and other non-state actors, to acquire such weapons. They all want military superiority. Should nuclear weapons be banned? Such weapons have the capacity to cause untold suffering indiscriminately to military and civilians alike. They can cause vast environmental and economic devastation, not only in the area and at the time of detonation, but throughout the world and for future generations. Surely nuclear weapons, including the so-called ``low-yield" nuclear weapons, carve out a far more destructive path than all of the weapons previously coming under the regime of a total ban. Nuclear weapons certainly need to be prohibited, but they must be prohibited for all states and all entities. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty requires all states party to the treaty ``to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." The International Court of Justice has described this as a binding treaty obligation. As long as some states, including the U.S. and China, insist on their right to retain nuclear weapons, other states will wish to own such weapons and will work out ways to acquire them, even if it means violating treaty obligations. If all the nuclear states would get together and start negotiations toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons, including their own weapons, with a tough verification system applicable to all, the ``problem" of North Korea, Iran and all of the other nuclear aspirants would begin to disappear. Under the present flawed structure, by which the nuclear states have legalized the ultimate double standard, all we have to look forward to is a new nuclear aspirant on the horizon every time we turn around. Trying to eliminate nuclear weapons will surely be a monumental task but its success might just ensure us all a future in a hopeful world. Valerie Epps is a visiting professor of law at Hongik University College of Law, Seoul, and professor of law and director of the International Law Concentration, Suffolk University Law School, Boston. She can be reached at vepps@suffolk.edu.

Final Warning on India Nukes Deal

By MADHUR SINGH/NEW DELHI

During the final full dress rehearsal for India's Republic Day Parade in New Delhi, a replica of India's Agni-III missile passes by spectators. The Agni is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.

Raveendran / AFP / Getty

Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher last week visited New Delhi with a sharp reminder: it's now or never for the Indo-U.S. Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, which has been stalled since India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh failed to garner the votes from within his own coalition to pass the deal.

Washington is warning that given the U.S. presidential campaign season, India has until June to complete all the steps required to get the agreement — which provides for civilian nuclear cooperation between the two countries without India having to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty — before Congress for a yes or no vote. Having invested immense political capital in the deal, the Bush administration is keen to see it completed, and has been quietly pressuring New Delhi to expedite matters. Last week, former Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns publicly asked India to take a "courageous decision" in view of the "short timelines". Before that, on February 20, U.S. Senators Chuck Hagel, John Kerry and Joe Biden has visited New Delhi with the same message.

Making haste, however, is proving difficult for India's government, because of the resistance to the deal by opposition parties as well as the leftist parties in the ruling coalition who have delayed the deal at every step since it was first proposed in July 2005. The government has sidestepped this resistance by agreeing to hold talks with leftist allies, buying itself time to complete the requirements to get the deal before the U.S. Congress. But now, time is running out. Experts agree that the current deal is the best one India can get: it allows India to trade internationally in nuclear materials and technology, without signing the CTBT and despite carrying on with its nuclear weapons program. And it has the backing of a congressional consensus in the U.S. sufficient to win endorsement on Capitol Hill. If the deal is not passed during the tenure of the current administration, however, its successor might seek to renegotiate on terms less favorable to India.

The realization that Washington's position may harden has prompted India's power brokers to burn the midnight oil in order to meet the deadlines. This requires concluding, by the end of this month, an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to regulate India's civilian nuclear energy program and to ensure that it remains separate from its nuclear weapons program. By May, they must secure an exemption from the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which controls international trade in nuclear materials, to rules that preclude supplying states that are not signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and India's failure to sign the Test Ban Treaty will not go down easily with some of its members. India reiterated its support for universal nuclear disarmament at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva last month, and proposed a seven-point agenda. Getting an NSG waiver will be tricky, but the U.S. has assured India of its support in convincing skeptics.

With opponents of the deal — mainly the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party — digging their heels in, the June deadline may prompt the government to tell its leftist allies to take a hike. Riding high on a popular budget announced last week — which substantially reduced income tax and waived $150 billion worth of loans owed by small and marginal farmers — the government is in a good position to face elections. Politicians know that the average citizen cares little about the nuclear deal, as the CPI (M) learned last September: While the CPI (M) was focusing its attention on holding up the nuclear deal in New Delhi, in Bengal, the state it governs, villagers angry at food shortages and corruption broke into a riot. Many CPI (M) cadres were assaulted in riots over the following weeks. Most Indians may, in fact, be glad to get the nuclear deal out of the way, so that politicians can get on with working on issues more important in the minds of the citizenry.

http://www.time.com/